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We investigate the effects of update rules on the dynamics of an evolutionary game-theoretic model
– the N -player evolutionary trust game – consisting of three types of players: investors, trustworthy
trustees, and untrustworthy trustees. Interactions between players are limited to local neighborhoods
determined by predefined spatial or social network topologies. We compare evolutionary update
rules based on the payoffs obtained by their neighbors. Specifically, we investigate the dynamics
generated when players use a deterministic strategic rule (i.e., unconditional imitation with and
without using a noise process induced by a voter model), a stochastic pairwise payoff-based strategy
(i.e., proportional imitation), and stochastic local Moran processes. We explore the system dynamics
under these update rules based on different social networks and different levels of game difficulty. We
observe that there are significant differences on the promoted trust and global net wealth depending
on the update rule. If the game is harder, rules based on unconditional imitation achieve the highest
global net wealth in the population. Besides a global perspective, we also study the spatial and
temporal dynamics induced by the rules and we find important spatio-temporal correlations in the
system for all rules. Indeed, the update rules lead to the formation of fractal structures on a lattice
and, when the rules are stochastic, also the emergence of low frequencies in the output signal of the
system (i.e., long-term memory).
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical frame-
work for investigating the dynamics of strategies in pop-
ulations ranging from two players to structured soci-
eties [1]. Trust between players plays a major role in
the evolution of games in a social context, and has deep
implications for the collective action of social and human
systems [2–4]. As players rely on trust to handle complex
problems and make decisions, relationships are formed.
These relationships, in turn, give rise to opportunities
and allow trust to spread [5]. A recent study found that
players are more trustworthiness when having uncalcu-
lating cooperation [6].
In terms of models, the most well-known version of
trust games considers interactions between two types of
players: investors (or trusters) and trustees [7–10]. In
these games, the investor must first decide whether to
trust the trustee. If the decision is positive, the trustee
must then decide whether to be trustworthy or not. Al-
though two-player games are the most common configu-
ration for trust games in the literature, they have their
limitations. For instance, we cannot generalize some of
the insights found in pairwise interactions to games with
multiple players having more than two strategies [11].
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Abbass et al. [5] therefore proposed an evolutionary
N -player trust game to generalize the concept of trust to
a well-mixed population of individuals who play a trust
game concurrently. Chica et al. [12] subsequently showed
that promoting trust in this N -player trust game depends
on the social network structure. In their model, a struc-
tured population of players have three possible strate-
gies to choose from: to be an investor (I), a trustworthy
trustee (T ), or an untrustworthy trustee (U). Players in-
teract with their direct neighbors on the social network,
and obtain their payoff values repeatedly through a num-
ber of time steps. They evolve their strategies according
to the obtained payoffs and update their strategies in a
non-deterministic way (i.e., using a proportional imita-
tion update rule).
In this paper, we extend on the work of Chica et al. [12]
by studying the implications in terms of spatio-temporal
correlations of different update rules in the same net-
worked multi-player trust game. In addition to a propor-
tional imitation update rule, we also consider uncondi-
tional imitation, a local Moran process, and a hybrid ap-
proach using unconditional imitation and a voter model
in a stochastic function. In three-strategy games, sys-
tems can exhibit repetitive succession of oscillatory and
stationary states [13]. This is because when having three
strategies, the outcome can be considerably more com-
plicated and the game can end in ever-increasing oscil-
lations or with the elimination of some of the existing
strategies [1]. It is thus important for us to examine the
effects of different update rules and how the system dy-
namics would change in this context.
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2In our simulations, we consider different social network
topologies (i.e., a simple regular lattice [14] and scale-free
(SF) networks [15, 16]). We also explore the effects of the
update rules for different values of the temptation to de-
fect ratio rUT in the trust game. This ratio rUT defines
the temptation to defect investors’ trust by the trustees
and measures the level of difficulty of the game. We eval-
uate the final steady state (i.e., surviving strategies) and
global net wealth (i.e., total payoffs) of the population to
observe which update rules and under which conditions
players can better promote trust and obtain the highest
net wealth of the population.
The effects of the different update rules are then exam-
ined to better understand how trustworthy and untrust-
worthy behaviors emerge and what is their corresponding
global net wealth like. The dynamics of the model are
first studied from the spatial perspective. It is known
that spatial games of evolution can generate dynamic
fractals, gliders and kaleidoscopes [1, 14], and so we an-
alyze the spatial formations as well as those spatial cor-
relations between the players’ behaviors and strategies.
Finally, we show the temporal dynamics of the model by
analyzing the signal of the system and investigate if the
majority of the rules generate those correlations. We also
explore if more elaborated correlations with both spatial
and temporal types occur in the model’s output.
II. MODEL
A. Model description
The multi-player trust game consists of a finite set
of agents occupying the nodes of a social network, with
edges denoting interactions between them (both for ac-
cumulating payoffs and strategy updating [17]). Each
player i chooses a strategy s from three possibilities at
every time step (s(i)) [12]: being an investor (strategy
I), being a trustworthy trustee (strategy T ), and being
an untrustworthy trustee (strategy U). During the evo-
lutionary game process, all players interact with their
directly connected neighbors at the same time in a single
game (group interaction [18]).
Initially, the agents’ strategies are assigned at random.
Let us consider a local neighborhood with a focal agent, i,
as shown in Figure 1. The game is played between i and
all its direct neighbors. In the neighborhood, there are kI
investors, kT trustworthy trustees, and kU untrustworthy
trustees. The equality kI + kT + kU = ki must always
be fulfilled for consistency’s sake, where ki is the degree
(number of connections) of focal node i.
By the rules of the game, every investor releases a
unit of payoff per time step. Since all the agents in
the neighborhood are playing the game as a group, this
means there are a total of kI units. Each of the kT + kU
trustees receives an equal division of this total quantity:
kI/(kT + kU ). A trustworthy trustee (strategy T ) then
returns the received fund multiplied by RT to the in-
FIG. 1. An illustration of players’ group diversity in the trust
game.
vestors: RT kI/(kT + kU ) (i.e., RT kI/kTU to each of the
kI investors, where kTU = kT + kU ). Each of the trust-
worthy trustees also receives the same amount of fund as
the investors. That is, the investment produces in total
2RT kI/kTU . On the other hand, untrustworthy trustees
(strategy U) return nothing but keep for themselves the
received fund multiplied by RU : RU kI/kTU .
The parameter rUT ∈ (0, 1) acts as the temptation
to defect ratio (to be untrustworthy), defined by rUT =
(RU−RT /RT ), and it is used to control the difficulty level
of the trust game. rUT values must fulfill the restriction
1 < RT < RU < 2RT . Taking into account the number
of players in the group and rUT , we can determine the
net wealth of individual agents, based on their payoffs,
and according to the strategy adopted by themselves and
their direct neighbors. The net wealth wi of a focal player
i is obtained as follows:
wi =

RT ·k∗T
k∗TU
− 1, i = 1, ..., kI
(investor),
RT ·k∗I
k∗TU
, i = (kI + 1), ..., (kI + kT )
(trustworthy),
(1+rUT )·RT ·k∗I
k∗TU
, i = (kI + kT + 1), ..., pop
(untrustworthy),
(1)
where k∗I , k
∗
T , and k
∗
TU are the numbers of investors,
trustworthy trustees, and both trustworthy and untrust-
worthy trustees in the local neighborhood of i, including
3the focal agent i itself. The net wealth of focal agent i is 0
when there is no trustee in the neighborhood (i.e., wi = 0
when k∗TU = 0). We are interested in the global net
wealth of the population W , calculated as W =
∑pop
i=1 wi.
After playing a game and calculating their payoffs, the
agents have an opportunity to update their strategies ac-
cording to the payoffs received. This operation is carried
out according to one of the evolutionary update rules,
which will be described next.
B. Update rules
Agents decide which strategy to choose based on the
population strategies in the previous time step (i.e., t−1)
and their payoff [19]. The strategy update follows an evo-
lutionary procedure based on neighbor imitation that can
be interpreted as information exchange within a social
learning process [17]. To be more precise, at time-step t,
a focal agent i (independently from its strategy) evaluates
its previous payoff results in t−1 and decides whether to
imitate a direct neighbor j’s strategy or not by using an
evolutionary update rule. These rules of imitative nature
are widely employed in the literature and represent a sit-
uation where bounded rationality or lack of information
forces players to copy (imitate) others’ strategies [20]. In
this work, we have considered the following four update
rules because of their different features (i.e., some are de-
terministic and others stochastic; some of them evaluate
all the neighbors and can make mistake while others not):
• Unconditional imitation (UI) [14]. A player i di-
rectly copies the strategy of the best performing
neighbor j only if the payoff wt−1j is better than
wt−1i . UI is a deterministic and strategic rule based
only on payoff maximization when imitating others.
• Hybridization of UI and a voter model (UI-VM).
By using this mechanism, players imitate others by
hybridizing two rules: UI, a totally deterministic
and payoff based rule, and the voter model [21], a
random decision-making mechanism based on just
picking the strategy of one of the neighbors, j, at
random. As done in [22], our model uses a proba-
bility parameter q for players to select between the
two update rules: the voter model is chosen as the
update rule by player i with probability q while UI
is chosen by player i with probability 1− q. We set
q = 0.1 for our experiments after some preliminary
analysis across a range of other values.
• The Moran (MO) process [23]. With this update
rule, focal agent i evaluates all its neighbors’ payoffs
and assigns probabilities to them. This update rule
is also stochastic but based on imitation dependent
on the payoffs. At each time step there are possibil-
ities to imitate each of the neighbors. Player i thus
can make mistakes by imitating a worse-performing
neighbor in terms of payoffs.
• Proportional imitation (PROP) [24]. It is a pair-
wise and stochastic update rule where players can-
not make mistakes during the imitation process
(i.e., never imitate players with a lower payoff
value). Agent i first evaluates if the individual net
wealth of neighbor j in the previous time step t−1
(wt−1j ) is higher than its own (w
t−1
i ). If the net
wealth of j is higher, i will adopt the strategy of
j with a probability depending on the difference
between their payoffs:
probtij =
max{0, wt−1j − wt−1i }
φ
, (2)
where φ = maxw − minw is the maximum pay-
off distance between two players to have probtij
properly normalized. The minimum possible net
wealth for the game minw is −1 when the focal
agent is an investor and its neighborhood is formed
by all untrustworthy trustees. The maximum pos-
sible net wealth for the game maxw occurs when
the focal agent is untrustworthy and all its neigh-
bors are investors. In this case, maxw is equal to
(1 + rUT )RT k
∗
I .
III. GLOBAL NET WEALTH
First, we will analyze the results of global net wealth
of the population (i.e., the conditions and update rules to
promote the highest sum of payoffs of all players of the
population). The simulations were run for 5, 000 time
steps until the model reached a stationary state using a
population of 1,024 players. We set RT to 6, as in [5,
12]. The temptation to defect ratio rUT was set to three
different values: 0.11, 0.33, and 0.66, which cover three
different trust scenarios: from an “easier” to a “harder”
evolutionary trust game. All experiments were repeated
for 100 independent Monte Carlo (MC) realizations.
We performed sensitivity analysis on the initial pop-
ulation conditions where the global net wealth was av-
eraged over the last 25% of the 5, 000 steps. Figure 2
shows heatmaps of the results for the four update rules
(individual columns of the panel) and three rUT values
with two social network topologies (see the six rows of
the panel). Specifically, we show results for a regular lat-
tice (REGULAR) and a SF network with average degree
〈k〉 = 4, generated using the Barabasi-Albert algorithm.
The first three rows report on the net wealth using SF,
with the game level rises from easy to a more difficult
level (rUT = {0.11, 0.33, 0.66}). The last three rows re-
port on the same results when considering a regular lat-
tice for the same difficulty game conditions.
We can see how, even for hard game conditions (rUT =
0.66), both UI and UI-VM can promote high “coopera-
tion” levels under a wide range of initial population con-
ditions when using a regular lattice (see the bottom left
plots of the panel). Generally, both UI-based update
4FIG. 2. Sensitivity analysis on different configurations of the initial population for the four considered update rules, two social
network topologies, and three values of rUT that define the difficulty level of the game (0.11, 0.33, 0.66).
rules (first two columns of the panel) perform equally in
terms of promoting trust cooperation. However, when
using a regular lattice, the use of UI-VM can generate a
wider region of high global net wealth than when using
the classical UI.
Trust cooperation results obtained by UI-based rules,
however, are not as good as MO and PROP update rules
in those scenarios where we used a SF topology under
easy game conditions (the first row of Figure 2). The
MO rule is able to obtain higher global net wealth values
but under narrower initial conditions (see the heatmap
plot at position (1,3) of Figure 2). When the game be-
comes harder, both MO and PROP update rules cannot
obtain high net wealth values when using a SF topol-
5FIG. 3. Snapshots of 32× 32 lattices with 1,024 players for the four update rules and three different rUT values. Blue cells are
players with strategy I, green cells are players with strategy T , and red cells are players with strategy U .
FIG. 4. Snapshots of 120×120 lattices with 14,400 players for
the UI and PROP update rules. Blue cells are players with
strategy I, green cells are players with strategy T , and red
cells are players with strategy U .
ogy and trust cannot be promoted (same in the case of
UI-based rules). See for example those heatmaps in the
third row of the panel, which correspond to the case of
rUT = 0.66. Both MO and PROP update rules are not
able to promote non-zero global net wealth at the end of
the simulations.
IV. MODEL DYNAMICS
In this section, we focus on the spatial and temporal
dynamics of the game using different update rules. For
all the analyses, we ran 100 independent MC realizations
with an initial population formed by 30% of players with
strategy I, 25% with strategy T , and 45% with strategy
U . We considered regular lattices of sizes 32 × 32 (i.e.,
1,024 players) and 120×120 (i.e., 14,400 players) to better
understand the spatial correlations between them.
A. Spatial effects
We start by showing spatial snapshots of the lattices
after reaching an equilibrium state. Figure 3 shows,
6FIG. 5. A mass study to show fractal structures for the four update rules in 32 × 32 (1,024 agents) and 120 × 120 (14,400
agents) lattices.
for each of the four update rules and three rUT values,
the spatial layout of the lattices with the three possible
strategies. Nodes in blue are those with strategy I, nodes
in green are those with strategy T , and nodes in red are
those with strategy U . We also show the spatial layout
when considering the 120× 120 lattice (14,400 player) in
Figure 4.
For both lattice sizes we can see similar cluster and
spatial formations. Also, the existing playing strategies
are in line with the global net wealth observed in the
previous section and Figure 2. UI and UI-VM rules, even
with hard cooperation conditions, are able to eliminate
all the U players (only blue and green cells remain). With
rUT = 0.66, however, untrustworthy players kU totally
dominate the population when the MO rule is in place,
and partially dominate the population when the PROP
rule is used.
The spatial layout also suggests a fractal structure.
This is especially clear when considering the UI rule,
which provokes the emergence of “organic” clusters in
the lattice. In order to further investigate the fractal
properties of the game, we study, in a steady-state stage
of the simulation, the relation of kI values (i.e., num-
ber of investors) when increasing a box size within the
lattice. Figure 5 shows this relationship for both lattice
sizes. Again, in this analysis we see that the number of
players (i.e., the size of the lattice) does not affect the
fractal properties of the game.
We have also fitted the exponents of these curves to
find the fractal dimensions (i.e., the number of players
playing each of the three strategies) and found their ex-
ponential values a for a f(x) = xa function. These a
values are shown in Figure 6 for rUT values ranging from
0.11 to 0.77 on the X axis. The right plot of the same
figure shows the number of existing playing strategies to
complement the fractal analysis. As we can observe in
these plots, for all the update rules, the output of the spa-
tial model presents a fractal structure with a values be-
tween 1.6 and 1.9. This fractal structure is constant un-
der different game difficulty conditions and for the three
dimensions, although clearer for the number of investors
kI .
The last spatial correlation analysis of this section con-
sists of calculating the spatial correlation coefficients for
all the players in the lattice located at a distance l. We
follow a similar approach in [25] by computing a spatial
correlation function G(l) as follows:
G(l) =
1
n
∑
∀i,j/d(i,j)=l
(str(i)− str(j))2, (3)
7FIG. 6. The right plot shows the number of players of each strategy (kI , kT , and kU ) at the end of the simulations. The
left plot shows fitted exponents of the three fractal dimensions (i.e., the three playing strategies kI , kT , and kU ) for the four
considered update rules. This experimentation was conducted using a 32× 32 lattice.
FIG. 7. Spatial correlation coefficients between players in a lattice separated at several distances l (both 32× 32 and 120× 120
regular lattices).
where n is the number of pairs of agents at distance l in
the lattice, d(i, j) is the distance in the lattice between
players i and j, and str(i) ∈ {1, 2, 3} represents the three
possible strategies of player i. Figure 7 shows all the G(l)
values for both 32×32 and 120×120 lattices for the four
update rules. We find similar trends for both lattice di-
mensions (please note the X axis is relative to the lattice
size), which again corroborates similar model behavior
independent of the number of players. We observe cyclic
oscillatory behavior when using one of the two UI-based
rules (top plots of the figure).
8B. Temporal correlations
In this section, we explore temporal correlations of the
model. Figure 8 shows, for each update rule, the power
spectrum of the signal, which refers to the total num-
ber of players playing strategy I (i.e., kI) at each step of
the simulation. This signal is obtained when the simu-
lation reaches a steady state. The left-hand plot shows
the power spectrum for the UI rule in a linear scale. We
see that the signal has a high frequency of 0.5Hz, which
means that there is a complete temporal correlation with
a period of 2 steps. This is because of the oscillatory be-
havior of UI within the model, also shown in the spatial
analysis in the next section.
More interestingly, the plot on the right shows the
power spectrum of the other three update rules in a log-
log scale. The three spectra of the rules have a power-law
distribution. This distribution is especially clear for the
PROP update rule, which shows a linear drop. These
power-law distributions of the spectra of the rules show
that the model’s output has many different low frequen-
cies. Therefore, when using non-deterministic update
rules, the model has a long-term memory (i.e., long tem-
poral correlations). This behavior is not common in this
kind of models, as many of them exhibit stochastic dy-
namics, where there is only a short memory and the de-
cision does not depend on previous history [26]. Finally,
we also see how the power spectrum of the UI-VM rule
(blue line) has a high-frequency peak because of the de-
terministic nature of UI.
C. Spatio-temporal correlations
We have calculated the spatio-temporal correlations
among pairs of players in the lattice as the final stage of
our experimentation analysis. Figure 9 shows plots with
the time-lag Pearson correlation values of four players’
time series with respect to a focal player. The calcula-
tion process was done as follows. We first set a focal
agent at random and four additional players situated at
a distance of 2, 4, 6, and 10 in the lattice with reference
to the focal one. The time series strategy evolution of the
focal agent and the other four players in the last 50% of
the steps are obtained. Later, the focal agent time series
is compared to the other four players’ time series to find
spatio-temporal correlations.
Here, we can see similar behavior to that observed
when analyzing the spatial and temporal correlations in-
dependently in the previous sections. There are high cor-
relation values for the UI deterministic rules (both UI and
UI-VM) and these correlations are cyclic and for all the
considered distances. This is related to the oscillatory
behavior seen for the UI rule. In the case of the other
two update rules (please note a lower Y scale for the
MO and PROP plots), correlation values are lower. Pro-
portional imitation (the bottom right plot of Figure 9)
has the highest correlation with the closest players (i.e.,
at distance 2). When using the MO update rule, correla-
tions tend to become a null value when increasing the lag
time between the series. As happened with the PROP
rule, there is a big difference between the correlation val-
ues of closer players and those at 6 or 10 nodes, where
there is not any spatio-temporal correlation.
V. DISCUSSION
In this work, we have shown the dynamics of differ-
ent update rules for a multi-player trust game of three
strategies. First, we looked at which rules and social net-
work topologies can obtain the highest trust cooperation
among players in the population. Based on the simu-
lation results, we can divide the update rules into two
groups: (1) the UI strategy and its hybridized update
rule with a voter model; and (2) the PROP and MO
rules. PROP and especially the MO update rule obtain
the best results in terms of global trust promotion when
the game is easy (rUT = 0.11), and the network topology
is SF. When the game is difficult, however, both UI-based
rules are able to better promote trust and obtain higher
global net wealth values for very different initial popula-
tion conditions. In contrast, MO and PROP are not able
to promote trust under difficult game conditions. With
respect to the network topology, using a regular lattice
enables better trust promotion leading to higher global
net wealth.
Apart from evaluating trust promotion by the rules,
we studied the spatial and temporal model dynamics.
We found that the UI-based rules form spatial clusters
of sponge-like areas. These patterns are created to en-
able the maximization of groups of trustworthy trustees
(strategy T ) with at least one investor (strategy I). More
interestingly, we found that not only UI but all the up-
date rules generate a fractal space on the lattice when
reaching a steady-state stage. Generally, spatial corre-
lations are important and occur mainly in closer players
within the lattice. By studying the power spectrum of the
model’s output we also observed that when introducing
stochasticity in the rules, a long-term memory appears
in the system. This means that for the UI-VM, MO,
and PROP rules, there are signals at low frequencies and
their spectra are of power-law nature.
Another interesting behavior is that the system is not
frozen when reaching a steady state for deterministic
rules such as the UI rule. There is a phenomenon related
to “switching” or cyclic oscillatory behavior (e.g., from
investor strategy I to trustworthy trustee T or the other
way round). From the temporal and spatio-temporal
analyses we found these oscillations and maximum corre-
lations with a 2-step period (a high frequency of 0.5Hz).
It is also clear that all of these switching nodes must have
more than one connection to create a “chain” of switching
nodes. The latter switching behavior was not observed
in the PROP update rule. We think the reason for not
having this behavior when using the PROP rule is be-
9FIG. 8. Power spectrum of the time series evolution in kI for a 32 × 32 lattice based on the UI (left plot) and UI-VM, MO,
and PROP rules (right plot).
FIG. 9. Spatio-temporal correlations between a focal player and players at distances 2, 4, 6, and 10 in a lattice.
cause it is the only rule that only evaluates one neighbor
to make a decision. When considering rules such as UI,
UI-VM, and MO, if one neighbor j changes the strategy,
the decision of focal player i changes totally, as all the
neighbors are evaluated to make a decision to imitate.
These important findings about the hidden dynamics
and spatio-temporal correlations in the game show the
complexity of managing trust in social networks in the
long run. They also open doors for future research on
evolutionary game theory in general and evolutionary
trust games in particular.
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